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 Abstract​: 
 
 
Author: Jillian H. Pflederer 
 
Title: Who is stateless and why?: Exploring how the UN and the international community are 
addressing statelessness by comparing two case studies of Syrian refugees living in Lebanon and 
Jordan. 
 
Supervising Professor: Dr. Ruth Wasem 
 
This thesis will explore how the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is 
addressing statelessness as an international crisis and their #IBelong campaign to eradicate 
statelessness by 2024. Next, it will define what statelessness is and how someone is determined 
to be stateless concerning the recommendations of UNHCR and international humanitarian law. 
Finally, it will focus on two case studies of how statelessness is affecting Jordan and Lebanon. 
The phenomenon of statelessness is not new. However, since the beginning of the Syrian Civil 
War, statelessness has become prominent among Syrian refugees living in Jordan and Lebanon. 
Both countries have strict citizenship laws which rule nationality can only pass on to a child 
through the father. Refugee children born to families with a Syrian father or fathers who died in 
the conflict are left without a nationality. Many children who fled Syria lack birth certificates and 
others who are born in refugee camps lack a claim to nationality. My thesis explores the leading 
causes of statelessness affecting Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon and how gender 
discriminatory citizenship laws perpetuate the phenomenon.  
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 General Statements: 
 
*For the purpose of this thesis all research and analysis refers to up until December 31st 2018. 
statelessness regarding Syrian refugees since this is a dynamic and evolving political issue.  
 
*As a clarification, throughout my thesis I am only considering how the UNHCR campaign to 
end statelessness is affecting Syrian refugees in both Jordan and Lebanon. I am not considering 
the situation of Palestinian refugees in either Jordan or Lebanon.  
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 What is statelessness: 
A man can lead a reasonably full life without a family, a fixed local residence, or a religious                  
affiliation, but if he is stateless he is nothing. He has no rights, no security, and little opportunity                  
for a useful career. There is no salvation on earth outside the framework of an organized state.                 
-Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State 3 (1970).  
 
There are over 10 million stateless persons in the world today. According to UNHCR, 
over 3 million stateless persons are children and over 140,000 of them are Syrian refugees. 
Another child is born stateless roughly every ten minutes. This thesis focuses on defining 
statelessness, what the United Nations is doing about it, and how it affects Syrian refugees living 
in Jordan and Lebanon. Leading factors of statelessness among Syrian refugees include a lack of 
birthright citizenship laws in the Levante, gender discrimination within Syrian nationality laws, 
and lack of documentation and registration paperwork due to the Syrian conflict.   1
The word stateless does not have a direct translation in Arabic. Many dialects have a 
different word to describe a stateless person. Stateless people in Syria are often known as 
maktoumeen​, which translates to “hidden”. Stateless people in Jordan are called ​bedoon, ​which 
translates to “without”. Both words have a connotation of not being worthy of recognition or 
rights. Statelessness is a fragile word in the Middle East because according to Islam, it is 
shameful to admit there are people living in the Muslim community that aren’t being 
acknowledged or taken care of . The negative connotations used to describe stateless persons 2
affects the way politicians and the public view stateless persons in their country. Governments 
should change the word they use to describe stateless persons that is more in line with the rights 
and attention they deserve .  3
1 ​"International: It's Tough To live in Limbo; Statelessness." The Economist, vol. 385, no. 8557. 
2 UNHCR regional protection officer interview.  
3 Howard, Analyzing the Causes of Statelessness in Syrian Refugee Children, D. M. 2017 
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 Definitions of citizenship also vary, however the general term implies “full membership” 
of a person to enjoy political, social, and civil rights within a community. Chief Justice Warren 
defined citizenship as “the right to have rights”. The U.S. Supreme Court defined stateless as a 
“membership in a political society, and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member 
and a duty of protection on the part of the society”. These rights include access to basic 
economic and social rights such as livelihood and healthcare.  
There are two types of statelessness, the first is called de jure statelessness, when the laws 
of no state recognize a person as a citizen. And the second is called de facto statelessness, when a 
person is entitled to citizenship under a state’s nationality law but the law does not recognize that 
person as a citizen. For example, many Syrians still have citizenship under the Syrian regime 
however their status as citizens are ineffective due to the civil war .  4
The Problem  
Over 4.8 million Syrian refugees are seeking asylum in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Turkey and an estimated 68-80% of refugees have not registered with the UN due to concerns 
regarding statelessness . Although it impossible to quantify the number of refugees that have 5
NOT registered with the UN, there are two points of interest to keep in mind. First, this is a 
rough estimate since there is no method of counting how many refugees are not registered, in 
most cases the estimate printed is much lower than the perceived estimate of UN officials. 
Second, it is possible to provide a rough estimate because even though a refugee is stateless it 
does not mean that they are invisible and so UN officials working with refugees in camps in 
4 ​Scott, J. B. (1930). Nationality: Jus Soli or Jus Sanguinis. ​The American Journal of 
International Law​, 24(1), 58. 
5 Howard, pg 27.  
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 Jordan and Lebanon are able to interact with persons both registered and unregistered and garner 
their estimates from such interactions.  
The three most prominent cases of statelessness in Jordan and Lebanon is lack of 
birthright citizenship laws, gender discriminatory nationality laws, and the loss of identity 
documents. Syrian law does not guarantee women the right to pass Syrian nationality on to their 
children. Since most countries hosting Syrian refugees don’t provide unconditional birthright 
citizenship, these children are in danger of becoming an “invisible” generation.  
Registration problems remain one of the most prominent challenges to addressing 
statelessness. Since 2011, more than 30,000 Syrian children have been born in Lebanon. Many of 
these children become stateless due to the gender-discriminatory nationality laws. In Syria, 
Jordan, and Lebanon if the father is not present, a newborn child is unable to be registered 
making them stateless. This obstacle remains even if the child’s mother is a national of the 
country of birth. For example, around 85,000 Jordanian women are married to non-citizens. 
There are more than 338,000 estimated children within these bi-national families who are at risk 
of becoming stateless. Statelessness can be avoided if the father’s name is recorded on the birth 
registration form if the child is born outside the country of origin . 6
Another why children are at risk of statelessness is if their birth certificates were lost or 
destroyed while fleeing Syria. Although this doesn’t legally prove they are stateless, it does make 
it difficult to prove their citizenship and therefore they are subject to harassment and exploitation 
while lacking access to basic services like healthcare and education. UNHCR Director of 
International Protection, Volker Turk, said “Syrian refugee children have not been able to 
6 Howard, pg 9. 
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 acquire documentation which proved they were Syrian nationals and unless this can be resolved 
at a later date, these children may be left stateless”. Therefore, lacking a birth certificate does not 
make a child stateless automatically but unless resolved and proven through a second registration 
through UNHCR, this child will be treated as stateless, if not becoming officially stateless. 
Senior advocate for the Middle East at Refugees International, Daryl Grisgraber, estimates that 
there are hundreds of thousands who are potentially not registered in the Middle Eastern region 
as a whole. This number contributes to the estimated 10 million stateless persons in the world 
today.  
Furthermore, Syrian children born outside regime controlled areas are likely not recorded 
on the government birth rolls. Making it just as difficult for those children to gain and maintain 
proof of citizenship as children born in host countries such as Jordan and Lebanon. In addition, 
Syria is neither a member of the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons nor to the 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which are legally binding documents for states to 
“grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless” . Not 7
being a signatory state, it is difficult for UNHCR and other international organizations to keep 
Syria accountable to eradicating statelessness. 
Immigration and national security drive citizenship policies. Another concern addressed 
by Sarnata Reynolds and Tori Duos in ​A Generation of Syrian Born in Exile Risk a Future of 
Statelessness​ is that ISIL is purposefully destroying birth certificates and passports belonging to 
Syrian citizens fleeing the country so that it is harder for them to return to Syria after the conflict. 
Syrian refugees face numerous obstacles crossing international borders if they lack identity 
7 Howard, pg 10-11. 
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 documents. ISIL’s prerogative in destroying such documents is to make it more difficult for 
citizens to return to Syria causing more chaos and challenges to the regime re-establishing power 
of territorial gains .  8
Rules of citizenship have changed globally throughout the 20th century. Citizenship is 
gained in four ways, birth, marriage, adoption, or naturalization. There are two legal categories 
of citizenship, jus sanguinis—blood descent and heritage determine citizenship and jus 
soli—birthright citizenship (except children of diplomats or other rare cases). There is 
unconditional jus soli which states a child becomes a citizen of the country in which he or she is 
born and there is conditional jus soli which limits citizenship rights to individuals born in a state 
to parents admitted for permanent residence and requires continued presence in state after birth. 
In 2004, the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act repealed unconditional jus soli in Ireland, 
making it the last country in Europe to have offered birthright to children born in their country. 
Today, there are roughly 30 countries that continue to offer unconditional jus soli but none of 
them are European . Failure to grant citizenship to children born within state borders creates a 9
generation of “invisible kids” that continue to be treated as second class citizens and grow in 
number creating a long lasting problem for the host country .  10
How statelessness affects Syrians: 
Syria become an independent country in 1946 when the French withdrew from the 
territory. Political organization such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ba’ath Party competed 
for control of the country’s government. The Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party came to power in a 
8 ​Sarnata Reynolds and Tori Duos in ​A Generation of Syrian Born in Exile Risk a Future of 
Statelessness.  
9 ​Jus Sanguinis, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Pg 8.  
10 ​Jus Soli, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
9 
 military coup in 1963 and Bashar al-Assad and his father ruled Syria since 1970. The Syrian 
conflict began in 2011 when the Arab Spring began and spread across the Levant. Protesters 
began to oppose Bashar al-Assad and civil war officially began in 2012.  
In December 2016, the Syrian government retook Aleppo from the opposition. As Syria’s 
second largest city this marked a turning point in the war in favor of Assad’s regime. There have 
been multiple local ceasefire and de-escalation agreements that have decreased violence between 
opposition groups and the government forces. Yet, even within de-escalation zones civilians 
have not been protected from the violence of war, as seen during the clashes in the Idlib and 
eastern Ghouta areas. According to a UN report, 33% of of the Syrian population faces food 
insecurity and 35% of the population depends on unsafe water sources . As of November 2017, 11
the UN delivered aid to 810,950 out of 3.5 million civilians in isolated regions. In addition, 
humanitarian agencies working in Syria reported the violation of protection rights by the 
Coalition-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which included Detention of IDPs, 
separation of families, restricting IDP movement, and the confiscation of identity documents. 
This phenomenon is one of the leading causes of statelessness. The confiscation of identity 
documents by rebel groups and the government lead forces make civilians vulnerable to losing 
identity papers vital to registering as a refugee or asylum seeker with the UN in a host country . 12
The UN officially is not facilitation or promoting return to Syria. However, according to 
UNHCR around 720,000 IDPs and 66,000 refugees returned home during 2017. A report from 
the U.S. State Department of Population, Refugees, and Migration said the percentage of 
11 ​Jayaraman, Shiva. "International Terrorism and Statelessness: Revoking the Citizenship of 
ISIL Foreign Fighters." Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 17, no. 1, 2016, pp. 178-216. 
12 ​State Source PPRC 2018 ANE Syria Organizational and Regional policy paper. 
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 refugees in Lebanon living below the national poverty line of $3.84 per day increased from 71% 
to 76% in the last year, and around 90% of Syrian refugees in Jordan live under the Jordanian 
poverty level .  13
Syrian citizenship law requires children to receive nationality through paternal jus 
sanguinis. A child can receive citizenship if their father is Syrian or through their mother under 
limited circumstances. For example, if her child is born in Syria illegitimately, or if her child is 
born in Syria and the child would not be able to acquire another nationality, or if she is Syrian 
and her child has not acquired another nationality and has not applied for Syrian nationality 
within the deadline. Even though the law includes the third provision to allow the mother to pass 
on nationality to her child if the father is absent, in reality these provisions are not implemented 
very often . Therefore, Syria does not provide effective protection for children vulnerable to de 14
facto statelessness.  
However, Syria recognizes a naturalization process if, before applying, an applicant 
meets a five-year legal residency requirement, is free of diseases, has full legal capacity, has 
good character, has specialization or expertise or legitimate means to earn living, and can read 
and write Arabic. Although this provision is in place it is incredibly hard to fulfill and does not 
provide a reliable or probable path to citizenship. For example, persons who are stateless but 
living in Syria can not obtain legal residency and thus fail to meet the five-year legal residency 
requirement.  
13 ​State Source PPRC 2018 ANE Syria Organizational and Regional policy paper 
14 ​Albarazi, Zahra. “The Stateless Syrians - Refworld.org.” ​Report of the Middle East and North 
Africa Nationality and Statelessness Research Project 7​ , 2017,  
11 
 In addition, Syria has a long history of gender discriminatory laws regarding nationality. 
For example, less than 3,500 Palestinians have acquired Syrian citizenship because Syria only 
grants citizenship to Palestinian women married to Syrian men, but not Palestinian men married 
to Syrian women. Syrian women married to a foreigner also cannot pass their nationality to their 
children because the law finds a Syrian Arab national’s marriage to a foreigner likely to weaken 
the national inclination in children. Syrian women in a bi-national marriage are also prohibited 
from passing on inherited property to their child and lack access to free education and have 
limited access to health care and social security. Interestingly, Syria is a signatory of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
which states all women have equal rights with men regarding transferring nationality to their 
children. However, disparities between signed treaties and national law as well as gender 
inequality and the lack of jus soli in European states make many Syrian children vulnerable to 
statelessness .  15
Article 3(D) of Syrian Nationality Law states “If a child is born in Syria and the child 
would not be eligible to acquire another nationality, that child is a Syrian citizen”. However, this 
provision is not enforced or upheld. Children born outside their parent’s country of origin and 
whose mother is unable to pass down citizenship due to nationality laws, are vulnerable to 
statelessness. If a child lacks documentation, it is difficult for the parents to prove their identity 
or birth registration and thus they are denied basic rights.  
“Not all refugees are stateless and not all stateless people are refugees” . What both 16
refugees and stateless persons have in common is that they are unable to rely on their state to 
15 ​Albarazi, pg 15-20.  
16 ​Article 3(D) of Syrian Nationality Law, pg 6.  
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 protect them or their rights. Some people are both refugees and stateless such as many in the 
Syrian conflict. As an unknown source said, “Statelessness is the absence of citizenship: 
Statelessness is a condition, caused by governments, that occurs when no state recognizes a 
person as its citizen under the operations of its laws”.  
 
How UNHCR is addressing statelessness: 
 
#IBelong Campaign  
In 2014, UNHCR launched its #IBelong global campaign to eradicate statelessness by 
2024. This campaign seeks to decrease statelessness by addressing both those who have lost their 
identification papers and those who are born into statelessness. It does this by providing funding 
and personnel to establish registration tents in areas of high statelessness populations. This sites 
provide a uniform and legally recognized method of assigning identity papers and registering 
stateless persons as refugees under UNHCR .  17
In April 2018, the UNHCR published its most recent #IBelong campaign update. 
Developments in the fight to end Statelessness include that on February 28th, the League of Arab 
States (LAS) gathered under the patronage of the Tunisian President, Beji Caid Essebsi for a 
Ministerial meeting on “Belonging and Legal Identity”. The members voted to adopt the 
Declaration on Belonging and Legal Identity (provided in both English and Arabic) which calls 
for equal nationality rights for women and children. During the same conference, LAS launched 
17 ​“#IBELONG to a World Where Everyone Has the Right to a Nationality.” Received by Open 
Letter, 4 Nov. 2014. 
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 its “I am Here” campaign to focus on tracking the progress of the declaration and the positive 
developments that flowed from it .  18
UNHCR also published an updated ​Background Note on Gender Equality, Nationality 
Laws and Statelessness ​on March 8th, 2018 that called for law reform in Sierra Leone regarding 
women passing on their nationality to their children. In Brazil there was a consultation meeting 
of Latin America and the Caribbean as a regional contribution to the Global Compact on 
Refugees on February 19-20th, 2018. Additionally, South Africa hosted the second meeting of 
the member states of the African Union to discuss the “AU Draft Protocol on Nationality and 
Statelessness” on March 13-16th, 2018. New York hosted the 62nd session of the UN 
Commission on the Status of Women which held a session specializing in “Advancing Gender 
Equality in Nationality Laws” followed by the European Network on Statelessness hosting an 
innovative new online tool the Stateless Index on March 20th, 2018. This tool was developed to 
compare data on statelessness for 12 European countries .  19
The index uses population data, statelessness determination procedures, detention, 
prevention, and reduction efforts throughout the 12 nations. Lastly, UNHCR’s 
Machine-Readable Convention Travel Documents (MRCTDs) for refugees and stateless persons 
reported progress regarding issuance of MRCTDs internationally. Currently, 30 states issue 
MRCTDs to stateless persons and 15 states issue other types of travel documents to stateless 
persons. While all of these conferences and reports are signs of progress toward decreasing 
18 ​“Join the Campaign to End Statelessness.” ​IBELONG ​, 2014,​ ​www.unhcr.org/ibelong/​. 
 
19 ​“Join the Campaign to End Statelessness.” ​IBELONG ​, 2014,​ ​www.unhcr.org/ibelong/​. 
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 statelessness, the #IBelong campaign has much work to do to reduce the number of stateless 
persons globally.  
Lebanon and Jordan are also taking measures to implement the #IBelong campaign in 
their countries. In Lebanon, the government adopted measures to simplify birth registration 
procedures for Syrian refugees in the country between January 1st, 2011 and February 8th, 2018. 
Reports estimate that over 50,000 children could potentially benefit from this initiative. These 
measures fall in line with Action 7 of the #IBelong Campaign: “Ensure birth registration for the 
prevention of statelessness” .  20
In Jordan, UNHCR and the governmental Ministry of Interior initiated a 7-month grace 
period to make uniform the status of Syrian refugees living in urban areas. This period will 
rectify the status of Syrian nationals who will then be able to benefit from UNHCR assistance 
and fulfill their birth and marriage registration processes. This method is expected to decrease 
the number of refugees vulnerable to statelessness within Jordan dramatically and was officially 
adopted on March 4th, 2018.  
Other events regarding the #IBelong Campaign include UNHCR’s annual NGO 
consultations in Geneva on June 27-29th, 2018. The theme of the conference was “Putting 
People First” and included sessions on “Statelessness and the Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Framework (CRRF)” which took place on June 27th, 2018 .  21
Interview with Program Officer for Asia and the Middle East Syria/Jordan and a Regional 
Protection officer: 
20 ​“UNHCR Lebanon Statelessness Update.” UNHCR, 2014. 
21  ​“Join the Campaign to End Statelessness.” ​IBELONG​, 2014,​ ​www.unhcr.org/ibelong/​. 
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 UNHCR is working with the League of Arab States to eradicate statelessness. They had a 
joint meeting in October 2017 which was the first time they had met together and it resulted in a 
declaration that was adopted by all members except the UAE. They drafted a model law and 
adopted a regional advocacy campaign called “I Am Here” that aims to end statelessness in the 
region. Additionally, there has been a revision in the Syrian law that only allows men to obtain 
certain civil documentation. This is a step backwards towards granting citizenship to more 
citizens and avoiding an increase in stateless persons. However, Syria claims to recognize 
foreign birth certificates which would be a step forward in decreasing statelessness and making it 
a smoother process for refugees once they return to their home country. A final sign of progress, 
at the start of the Syrian conflict there was a 35% gap in birth registration but now there is only a 
2.5% gap (but this is birth registration, not evidence of citizenship) . 22
In Jordan, citizenship can only be passed down through the male. If a Jordanian woman is 
married to a man from another nationality, that child automatically become Jordanian. For 
example, if a woman moved from Jordan to Syria 20 years ago and married a Syrian man and 
gave birth, that child won’t have the opportunity to gain a birth certificate. Then once the refugee 
crisis broke out, the mother moved to Jordan with their child and the father stayed behind in 
Syria the mother can’t claim Jordanian citizenship for her child since the father is not present. 
She also would not qualify for refugee status because she is Jordanian and the father is not 
present. She would find herself in a predicament and UNHCR couldn’t help her since she didn’t 
fall under their stateless persons mandate and neither will the Jordanian government recognize 
22 ​Interview, program officer at the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration at the U.S. 
Department of State, “Update on the Statelessness in the Levant.” Apr. 2018. 
16 
 the status of her child. This is a very specific example that affects a minority of people, however 
it is just one way that statelessness can present itself in unexpected ways .  23
The U.S. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) sees many Syrian 
children born in Syria but living in Jordan without identity papers. Even children born in Jordan 
may lack identity papers because their parents can’t or didn’t register them at birth and are now 
vulnerable to becoming stateless. Some of the challenges that stand in the way of children 
registering in their own country include lack of proof of marriage of their parents or if their 
mother was a minor at marriage or at birth. Under Sharia law women are allowed to be married 
at 16 and 17 years of age. However, couples who get married when the women is only 15 or 
younger often avoid registering their marriage because they fear legal repercussions. This sets 
them up to face problems once they have a child and need proof of marriage in order to get a 
birth certificate or identity papers for their child.  
UNHCR is working to register Syrian refugees in Jordan and provide them birth 
certificates. When this is not possible, UNHCR works to collect data and provide them identity 
papers so that when they return to Syria they can apply their children for birth certificates. 
UNHCR promotes both reduction and prevention of statelessness. One way that prevention 
relates to ending statelessness is ensuring citizenship could be attainable through both parents. 
Jordan is being pressured to move in that direction. This will mean a long legislative battle that is 
highly politicalized. Jordanian moms and the UN are some of the biggest voices calling for 
change. They receive push back from the conservative East Bankers who don’t want the number 
23 Interview, program officer.  
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 of Jordanian citizens to increase unless they are East Bankers too and other political and 
religious voices . 24
UNHCR’s Global Action Plan to End Statelessness  
The Global Action Plan to End Statelessness provides a guiding framework of 10 Actions 
for states to undertake with support of UNHCR and other international organizations to 
effectively identify and protect stateless persons, resolve large populations of stateless persons, 
and prevent new cases of statelessness. UNHCR has the goal of eradicating statelessness by 2024 
and encourages states and to partner with them and follow one or more of the 10 Actions laid out 
in the document. International agencies, civil society, stateless persons, global organizations and 
supporting governments are asked to join in the movement and pursue relevant actions .  25
In 2013, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees announced his desire for the “total 
commitment of the international community to end statelessness”. This Action Plan is a major 
step in that direction. It is recommended that each state develop a National Action Plan for 
accomplishing any number of the actions laid out by the Global Action Plan (GAP) that are 
applicable for their nation. Not all of the 10 Action Plans are applicable to every country where 
statelessness is present and thus not all 10 Action points must be included in a country’s National 
Action Plan. Additionally, the GAP focuses on non-refugee stateless persons even though it is 
possible to be both a refugee and a stateless person.  
Resources to support the GAP have been allocated from the “Seeds for Solutions” fund to 
increase UNHCR’s financial support of GAP from 12 million in 2009 to 40 million in 2015 and 
24 Interview, program officer.  
25 ​Global Action Plan to End Statelessness: 2014-24. United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 2014. Pg 1.  
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 welcomes continued support from outside sources and donors to help end statelessness. UNHCR 
has also hired 20 specialists to work with national governments to help implement their National 
Action Plan .  26
Below is a framework of the 10 Actions laid out by UNHCR’s plan to eradicate statelessness:  
 
 
1. Resolve existing large populations of stateless persons. 
2. Ensure no child is born stateless. 
a. Goal: all states have a provision in their nationality laws to grant nationality to 
stateless children born in their territory, of unknown origin found in their territory, 
and born to nationals abroad who are unable to acquire another nationality.  
3. Remove gender discrimination from nationality laws. 
a. Goal: all states have nationality laws which treat women and men equally with 
regard to conferral of nationality to their children and with regard to the 
acquisition, change and retention of nationality.  
4. Prevent denial, loss or deprivation of nationality on discriminatory grounds. 
5. Prevent Statelessness in cases of state succession. 
6. Grant protection status to stateless migrants and facilitate their naturalization.  
a. Goal: 70 states identify stateless migrants through determination procedures 
which lead to a legal status that permits residence and basic human rights, and 
facilitates naturalization.  
26 ​Global Action Plan to End Statelessness, pg 2.  
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 7. Ensure birth registration for the prevention of statelessness. 
8. Issue nationality documentation to those with entitlement to it. 
9. Accede to the UN statelessness conventions. 
a. Goal: 140 states party to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons. 130 states party to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness.  
10. Improve quantitative and qualitative data on stateless populations. 
a. Goal: Quantitative data on stateless populations is publicly available for 150 
states and qualitative analysis on stateless populations is publicly available for at 
least 120 states . 27
In 2014, there were 20 major non-refugee statelessness situations reported around the 
world. The goal of the GAP was to ensure that by 2017, there were law, policy, and 
administrative reforms to grant nationality to non-refugee stateless person in 10 of the major 
non-refugee statelessness situations. Also, that by 2020 there will be law, policy, and 
administrative reforms to grant nationality to non-refugee stateless person in an additional 5 of 
the major non-refugee statelessness situations. And finally, that by 2024 there will no 
non-refugee statelessness situations remaining .  28
Major activities that the UNHCR can do is advocate and advise on the process of 
reforming nationality laws, policies, and procedures that grant citizenship to stateless persons. 
Support government activity of reviewing applications and issuing documentation as well as 
sending work teams throughout the population to ensure access to registration procedures. 
27 ​Global Action Plan to End Statelessness, pg 3-4.  
28 ​Global Action Plan to End Statelessness, pg 7.  
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 Finally, UNHCR can support and engage in long-term solutions through dialogue, reconciliation 
and confidence-building when governments face discriminatory social attitudes towards ending 
statelessness. For the purpose of this thesis, I will focus on Action Plans 2, 3, and 7 which are 
related to some of the largest challenges facing Jordan and Lebanon in their journey to eradicate 
statelessness.  
Action Plan 2: Ensure that no child is born stateless: 
As of 2014, at least 70,000 children were born in the 20 major reported non-refugee statelessness 
situations each year and were not able to acquire citizenship. Also, 28% of states have 
inadequate provisions for granting nationality to children who are born stateless, this statistic 
includes both Jordan and Lebanon. A child is born stateless if their parents were stateless, or 
were abandoned at birth and whose nationality is unknown, or if their parents were not able to 
pass on their nationality to their children based on the nationality laws of the host country. The 
1961 Convention sets out a safeguard that ensures all children are granted citizenship if they 
were born otherwise vulnerable to statelessness. UNHCR suggests that host countries work with 
UNICEF and civil society organizations to raise awareness about children’s rights within a host 
country’s national law and international treaties. Also, UNHCR can help by supporting the legal 
community to grant children nationality who otherwise would be vulnerable to statelessness. 
This can be done by providing personnel and funds and legal aids to the legal professionals who 
are working in the justice sector regarding nationality laws . 29
Action Plan 3: Remove Gender Discrimination from Nationality Laws: 
29 ​Global Action Plan to End Statelessness, pg 11.  
21 
 As of 2014, 27 states had nationality laws which did not permit women to pass on nationality to 
their children. How this applies to both Jordan and Lebanon as is further discussed in the case 
studies explored later on in the thesis. Such laws discriminate on the basis of gender and conflict 
with Article 9(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women. To amend this problem, reform laws are needed to retroactively grant nationality to 
anyone who has been left stateless due to discriminatory laws. For example, a clause could be 
added to state law that children who are left stateless who have a mother who is a citizen 
automatically be granted their mother’s nationality in order to avoid becoming stateless, 
regardless of the nationality of their father. UNHCR can help by providing legal and social 
support with UN Women, UNICEF, OHCHR and civil society members of the Global Campaign 
for Equal Nationality Rights.   30
Action Plan 7: Ensure Birth Registration for the Prevention of Statelessness: 
There is no data to count how many children are unregistered since the very act of being 
unregistered is uncountable. However, UNICEF estimated that in 2010 there were around 3 
million unregistered children. This number is an estimate at best and there is reason to believe it 
has grown since 2010 as more refugees arrived in host countries where children were born in 
undocumented areas and not registered at birth. Some host countries lack working registration 
procedures and others have overly complex or strict registration policies. This is a major 
deterrent for a refugee considering registering in a new country because they might face social 
and language barriers making it difficult to register successfully. Also, some countries have 
lengthy, costly, and complicated procedures for late birth registration which deter families 
30 ​Global Action Plan to End Statelessness, pg 12.  
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 attempting to register their child years after they are born. Additionally, they will face numerous 
requests for identification documentation that they may feel weary to hand over to an unknown 
local official. UNHCR supports a free and accessible non-discriminatory basis for all refugees 
and non-refugee persons vulnerable to becoming stateless, including procedures for delayed birth 
registration. UNHCR can help by supporting the work of UNICEF, UN regional commissions, 
UNFPA, WHO, UNDP, the World Bank, regional development banks and bilateral donors to 
promote technical support for birth registration and statistics systems. This includes setting up 
registration tents with resources and personnel to serve stateless persons within the local area.  31
 
Determination Procedures: 
Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance 
This section will explore what makes a person stateless by international humanitarian law 
as adopted by UNHCR and other international organizations and states. International 
Humanitarian Law was first recognized as an official concept in the early 19th century. After the 
dramatic events of World War I and World War II, there was a need for agreed upon law relating 
to how military operations are conducted, political behavior of states, changing structure of 
international community, and the evolving international legal concepts and new technology. In 
order to apply international humanitarian law to the variety and diversity of global contexts, 
there are cardinal principles that must remain the same. For example, one such principle is the 
31 ​Global Action Plan to End Statelessness, pg 18. 
23 
 maintenance of absolute neutrality and impartiality when humanitarian action is involved to aid 
victims of violence. 
 This principle is easier said than done but remains vital for humanitarian assistance to 
avoid political cross-currents and bias. The United Nations seeks to enforce this principle by 
sending peacekeeping troops to mitigate military forces that prevent the delivery of humanitarian 
aid.  International humanitarian relief is a complicated issue that has drastic consequences for 32
the provider, receiver, and the host country. For this reason, the International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law (IIHL) promotes the development of international humanitarian law through 
its publication called “Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance” which 
includes aspects of the conclusions and recommendations of the 17th Round Table on Current 
Problems of Humanitarian Law: “The Evolution of the Right to Assistance” that was hosted by 
the IIHL in Sanremo, Italy in September 1992.   33
The document lays out 14 Principles that reflect the goals and methodology of the IIHL 
in promoting international humanitarian law globally. Principles 1- state that every person has a 
right to humanitarian assistance and explains why and how that assistance may be requested and 
granted. For example, a person may request humanitarian aid when there is an emergency 
situation threatening the survival and/or respect for human dignity. Principles 4-7 state that the 
primary responsibility to assist victims of emergencies lie on the authorities of the given country 
and the right to deliver aid to the victims of emergencies lie on international organizations such 
as ICRC, UNHCR, and other professional humanitarian organizations. It is helpful to have these 
32 ​United Nations. “Rule of Law and Transitional Justice.” ​UNHCR ​, 
33 ​Patrnogic, Jovica. “The International Institute of Humanitarian Law -25 Years of Humanitarian 
Dialogue.” ​ICRC​, 1, 31 Aug. 1995,  
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 principles in writing in case the host country responds to the intervention from international 
organisations as a violation of their sovereignty. If a host country does refuse or resist the offer 
of humanitarian assistance to those suffering inside their borders the states and organizations in 
question have the right to take all steps necessary within the limits of international humanitarian 
law and human rights instruments to enforce the state principles.   34
Principles 8-10 specify what type of aid may be delivered and the mechanisms to do so. 
For example, humanitarian assistance may include foodstuffs, water, medication, medical 
supplies and equipment, clothing, shelter, religious and spiritual assistance, and civil defence 
insofar as is stated within international humanitarian law and is not diverted for military or 
political means. Principles 11-12 determine the safety and protection of humanitarian assistance 
personnel involved in delivering aid and that the organizations involved in providing assistance 
are able to monitor their activities. Principles 13-14 declare that all humanitarian assistance 
efforts be coordinated to avoid duplication and waste and that the principles laid out in this 
document should not be used to impair or modify the rights of states or persons under 
international law.  35
Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons 
Part One: 
The UNHCR published a Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons in Geneva in 2014 
relating to the 60th anniversary of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons. Although the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness provides a set of tools 
for eradicating Statelessness, the 1954 Convention ensures that stateless persons maintain a life 
34 ​Patrnogic 
35 ​Patrnogic. 
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 of dignity and security. The responsibility of this handbook were initially focused on stateless 
persons who were refugees according to paragraph 6 (A) (II) of the UNHCR Statute and Article 
1 (A) of the 1951 Convention. However, in 2006, the UNHCR was entrusted with the 
responsibility for identification, prevention, and reduction of stateless persons generally.   36
Including a literature review of this handbook is important to understanding the basic 
laws and regulations of statelessness as defined by the UNHCR and other prominent IOs and 
NGOs working to eradicate it. However, it is important to understand that not all the laws and 
regulations included in this chapter relate to Jordan and Lebanon. While many of the rules are 
applicable in both countries, some of the rules are not followed by the governments of Jordan 
and Lebanon regarding Syrian refugees.  
As introduction, the 1954 Convention remains the only international treaty that 
specifically regulates the standards of treatment for stateless persons. The Convention was 
organized after the end of World War II brought the need to protect stateless persons and 
refugees to the forefront. This handbook is comprised of the definition of a “stateless person”, 
their rights and obligations, and the provisions that govern accession to the Convention and 
cooperation of states with UNHCR. This handbook refrains from referring to stateless persons as 
“de jure” since that term does not appear in the text itself. The term “de facto” is sometimes used 
in this handbook even though it is not defined by any international instrument or official treaty. 
This handbook also supports the idea that each state must identify stateless persons with their 
own jurisdiction so that they can provide them treatment in line with Conventional commitments. 
The Convention also encourages more states to adopt official statelessness determination 
36 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons. Geneva, 2014, ​Handbook on Protection of 
Stateless Persons. 
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 procedures to enhance respect for the human rights of stateless persons through legal status and 
rights. States benefit from introducing statelessness determination procedures because it reveals 
the root causes and scope and size of the issue so governments can work towards prevention and 
eradication more effectively.   37
This handbook examines the issue of stateless persons in countries that are and are not 
signatories of the 1954 Convention as well as those that are considered “de facto” stateless. An 
important point of the handbook is to recognize that although all stateless persons must be 
treated in line with international standards, their treatment can vary depending on the state and 
context of the situation. The last point covered in the handbook is the difference between a 
refugee and stateless person and which Conventions address each person in question.  
The beginning of the handbook contains criteria for determining statelessness. Article 
1(1) of the 1954 Convention defines a stateless person as one who is not considered as a national 
by any State under the operation of its law. This definition remains binding to all signatories of 
the 1954 Convention. The handbook argues it is preferable for a person to gain nationality 
compared to recognition and protection as a stateless person. A stateless person does not, by 
definition, have had to cross an international border. However, this thesis focuses on how 
statelessness effects Syrian refugees in Jordan or Lebanon which have, by definition, crossed an 
international border. The definition of “state” in Article 1(1) is defined by the 1933 Montevideo 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States as a defined territory, government, and population 
that has the capacity to enter into relations with other States.   38
37 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 22. 
38 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 11. 
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 Another important part of the definition to consider is when a person “is not considered 
as a national” of any state. It is not always beneficial to consult the law of the state on what 
defines a national or not because not all states follow their written law. Rather it is more helpful 
to establish whether an individual’s nationality status depends on an automatic or non-automatic 
mode. Automatic modes include when nationality is acquired as soon as the legal criteria are 
met, such as birth or birth to nationals of a state.  In contrast, non-automatic modes include 39
when an individual or a state authority is required to take an action before the change in 
nationality takes place. When an automatic mode of nationality is lost, a state institution that has 
the power to clarify an individual’s nationality status is responsible for determining their 
determination status. Examples of such an authority include, passport authorities, consular’s 
office, or civil registration officials.  
The competent authority has the power to declare an individual eligible for automatic 
acquisition of nationality if they don’t already have it, over the letter of the law. This rule is set 
in place to override possible discrimination by the government or ruling authority. It is also 
possible that an individual be treated inconsistently by different competent authorities. For 
example, a person may receive public benefits without obtaining proof of nationality and then be 
denied a passport when they reach adulthood. Inconsistent treatment like this may be an instance 
of a national’s rights being violated, however it is hard to prove this or to defend that person’s 
rights if they never received documentation of their nationality.   40
An interesting addition to the law states that if the competent authority provided an 
individual non-automatic nationality in bad faith or due to an misunderstanding of the law, this 
39 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 14. 
40 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 18. 
28 
 action does not automatically invalidate the individual’s nationality status. The same rule applies 
to individuals who have had their nationality stripped away due to a fraudulent application or 
mistakes in their application. Under Article 1(1), if the competent authority treats the individual 
inconsistently with the decision of a nationality review body, the national’s rights are being 
breached and the competent authority is responsible.  This rule depends on the relationship 41
between the executive and judicial branches of the government and the ultimate decision lies 
with the branch that has the mechanisms to enforce their decision.  
Another issue is the voluntary renunciation of nationality. If an individual reliquites their 
nationality status it is an act of free will and should take the form of an oral or written 
declaration. Opposed to what some states argue, voluntary renunciation of nationality does not 
mean that a state authority is able to exclude that individual from coverage of Article 1(1). The 
1954 Convention equally covers stateless persons and their human rights for those who 
voluntarily or involuntarily withdrawal their nationality.  
As regards the definition of statelessness, each country has their own definition for what 
a national is for their country. For example some indicate a national as a “citizen” or “subject”. 
The 1954 Convention regards the definition of a stateless person to reflect a political and legal 
link between the individual and the state under international law. This type of nationality does 
not relate to a membership of a religious, linguistic, or ethnic group.  42
There are also instances where an individual may obtain nationality that gains them right 
of entry and re-entry into particular places in a state. For example, a national may only be 
granted permission into a non-metropolitan territory for certain historical reasons. This fact does 
41 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 19. 
42 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 21. 
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 not allow for a national to be treated any differently than another according to Article 1(1). There 
are also prohibitions against discrimination based on grounds such as race as supported by 
international human right treaties.  
Part two: 
The next section of the handbook on protection of stateless persons includes the 
procedures for the determination of statelessness.  The assessment of statelessness is necessary 43
when an individual seeks protection under the application of the 1961 Convention. ​In situ ​refers 
to the type of statelessness where the individual remains in their own country. Depending on the 
type of statelessness, some states are encouraged to undertake nationality campaigns or 
nationality verification efforts rather than statelessness determination procedures.  
The difference between nationality campaigns and determination procedures is the former 
focuses on resolving statelessness through granting nationality, whereas the latter focuses on 
identifying the person as stateless to provide them with an official status. One of the benefits of 
nationality verification is that is helps individuals who have difficulties obtaining proof of their 
nationality status, obtain documentation with a swift and straightforward process. Interestingly, 
where there is a lack of documentation, such as birth registration, the sworn testimony of 
community members that an individual is from a certain territory or descent from a parent who is 
a national may suffice to prove their nationality during a nationality verification procedure. This 
method is beneficial in the case of an individual having lost or been robbed of their identity 
papers.   44
43 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 25. 
44 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 55. 
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 Although the 1954 Convention sets out rules and regulations for the registration 
procedures, it does not mention anything about the design or operation of statelessness 
determination procedures. These are left up to the discretion of the states and should be based on 
the estimated size and diversity of the local stateless population and the legal and evidentiary 
issues at hand. The UNHCR recommends centralized procedures opposed to locally run 
procedures because official oversight is key to maintaining successful and effective registration 
procedures. The UNHCR recommends that states allow the submission of written applications 
through local offices to the central determination body. Even a personal interview with the 
applicant can take part at the local level as long as there are appropriate oversight provisions for 
the rest of the application process. It also deciphers what kind of registration process is the most 
appropriate regarding the type of stateless procedure taking place. For example, some states 
choose to integrate the stateless determination procedures within the immigration authorities.  
Others may decide to place stateless determination procedures within the same body 
responsible for nationality issues, such as a naturalization applications and nationality 
verification requests. Stateless persons can also be refugees. In this case, UNHCR recommends 
that statelessness and refugee determination take place within a single procedure so as to increase 
efficiency. However, maintaining confidentiality requirements for asylum seekers and refugees is 
incredibly important. The handbook on protection of stateless persons suggests the following 
safeguards to ensure fairness, transparency, and clarity in determination procedures.   45
45 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 43. 
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 1. Information regarding eligibility criteria, the determination procedure, rights of 
recognition of statelessness is disseminated widely and with counseling in a language the 
applicant can understand.  
2. A right to an interview with a decision-making official. 
3. Help is available for translation/interpretation of written applications and interviews. 
4. Every individual of a family has a right to an independent application. 
5. An adult may apply on behalf of a dependant child and safeguards for unaccompanied 
children are also in place.  
6. A child has a right to be heard if they have the ability to present an opinion.  
7. Where free legal advice is available, it should be accessible to applicants free of charge. 
8. Each determination is made regarding the specific nationality laws and practices of the 
state in question pertaining to the law and practice applicable to the period of time that is 
relevant.  
9. If the determination process takes place in a judicial setting, the process should be 
inquisitorial and not adversarial.  
10. The decision of the competent authority should be made in writing and with a relevant 
explanation and within a reasonable time period.  
11. There should be a right of appeal and access to UNHCR.  
The handbook also suggests the determination procedures be formalized in law.  
Access to registration procedures is vital given that many individuals are hesitant to apply 
for statelessness status or unaware of how to do so. There is no time limit within the Convention 
for an individual to claim statelessness status. Also, anyone and everyone within a state’s 
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 territory is eligible to apply for statelessness status. Each state authority is required to make a 
decision regarding the individual's application within a few months if the application is clear and 
the statelessness claim is well-founded.   46
The next section regards coordinating refugee status and statelessness determinations. 
When an individual applies for both refugee and statelessness status, both applications should be 
equally considered. Under the 1951 Convention there are more rights at the national level than 
under the 1954 Convention. Sometimes a refugee status can expire before a person officially 
acquires a nationality. Hence, that person should receive international protection as a stateless 
person.   47
In addition, the identity of a refugee or an asylum seeker should not be disclosed with the 
state authority of the person’s country of origin. If both the determination procedures for refugee 
status and statelessness status are being conducted simultaneously, and there is insufficient 
information to determine whether a person is stateless or not, then the refugee status 
determination should proceed. Sometimes these procedures cannot continue simultaneously 
because an authority from a foreign state must be contacted to gather more information. 
However, a statelessness claim can be reactivated if and only if; a refugee claim fails, a refugee 
status is reviewed by subsequently ceases, a refugee status is cancelled due to the inclusion 
criteria of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention were not met fully, or additional evidence 
confirms that an individual is stateless.   48
46 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 19. 
47 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 30.  
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 Next, the process requires the assessment of evidence, both fact and law, during a 
statelessness determination procedure. A case cannot be settled only through the analysis of 
nationality laws alone. Therefore, both evidence regarding the individual’s circumstances and 
evidence regarding laws of the host country are necessary to conduct a realistic assessment of the 
person’s status. Examples of evidence that may be assessed include; testimony of the applicant 
(this may include more than one interview), enquiry from a foreign authority concerning the 
individual’s nationality status, national identity card, voter registration document, travel 
documents, certificate of naturalization, marriage certificate, applications to obtain nationality or 
proof of nationality, military service records, school certificates, medical certificates, responses 
by states to enquires of an applicant’s nationality status, identity documents of family member, 
immigration documents, property deeds, record of sworn oral testimony of neighbours and 
community members. It is preferable if each piece of evidence presented is obtained from 
multiple reliable and unbiased sources.   49
Interestingly, the burden of proof is shared between the applicant and the examiner 
during a statelessness determination procedure. Both parties are responsible for being truthful 
and fully examining all evidence available. However, contact with authorities from a state from 
which the individual has expressed a fear of persecution is not to be considered unless that 
individual has not been approved for status as a refugee or entitled to a form of protection.  
Under Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention, the stateless person definition requires a 
proof of a negative that a person is not considered as a national by any state. This wording makes 
it especially important and tedious to examine all possible evidence of an applicant’s claim. The 
49 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 32. 
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 examiner should not automatically conclude negative inferences where there are discrepancies 
between the nationality laws of the state in question and the applicant. Some of the discrepancies 
could be due to the amount of emotional and physical trauma that the applicant has undergone. 
Instead, the applicant should be given the opportunity to clarify any gaps or contradictions in 
their account as well as be judged only according to the laws of the specific location and time 
where they are claiming statelessness status. This handbook suggests states adopt the same 
standard of proof required during a refugee status determination, namely, that statelessness be 
granted whenever it is deemed “a reasonable degree” that an individual falls under the 1954 
Convention definition.  
Additionally, sometimes it is appropriate to conduct ​Prima facie​, or recognition based on 
“proved stateless until proved otherwise” as laid out in the 1954 Convention. This pathway is 
helpful when there is objective information regarding the lack of nationality of a certain group. 
This procedure does not require an individual assessment procedure but rather is based on a 
group determination basis. It must be maintained that all group determination procedures follow 
the exclusion clauses set out in Article 1(2) of the 1954 Convention which include;  
(i) To persons who are at present receiving from agencies of the United Nations other than the 
UNHCR protection or assistance so long as they are receiving such protection or assistance;  
(ii) To persons who are recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which they 
have taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of 
the nationality of that country;  
(iii) To persons with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that: They have 
committed a war crime or non-political crime or a crime against peace or humanity. Or they have 
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 committed acts contrary to the principles of the United Nations  (iii was paraphrased from the 
original text).   50
Detention of stateless persons may sometimes be necessary but is not encouraged and 
many restrictions and recommendations apply. The absence of identity papers immigration 
permits cannot be the sole grounds for detention of individuals. Article 9 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees the right to liberty and security of 
person, prohibiting unlawful and arbitrary detention. Stateless persons are at a much higher risk 
of prolonged and/or arbitrary detention and thus addressing statelessness also lowers an 
individual’s vulnerability to detention.   51
According to this handbook, the role of UNHCR is to assist states to maintain their 
statelessness mandate through ensuring the fairness of determination procedures from its role as 
an international mediator or as a conductor of statelessness determination procedures at an 
individual or group level itself. There are also additional procedural and evidentiary safeguards 
for specific groups based on their age, gender, diversity, level of education which require a 
separate individual procedure. Women might face increased obstacles when acquiring relevant 
documentation. Also, during interviews it is most appropriate to pair interviewees with 
interviewers of the same sex.   52
The next topic is of increased importance to both Jordan and Lebanon. Neither state is a 
signatory of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, however both states 
are still responsible for following certain regulations of international human rights law. 
50 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 40. 
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 Statelessness itself is  juridically relevant because it includes the right for women and men to be 
treated equally (Article 9 of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women). Officially, ​de facto ​statelessness is not included in the 1954 
Convention, however some states have incorporated ​de facto ​statelessness into their 
determination procedures alongside the criteria of the 1954 Convention.   53
Part three: 
The next section of the handbook on Protection of Statelessness Persons addresses the 
status of stateless persons at the national level. The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons is modelled on the text from the 1961 Convention on Refugees. Both 
conventions state that a person is stateless the moment they satisfy the criteria in the 1954 
Convention and not the moment that they are recognized as stateless by either a state or by 
UNHCR. A stateless person may also be a refugee simultaneously. Articles 12-32 of the 1954 
Convention list a number of civil, economic, social and cultural rights for states to follow 
regarding stateless persons. However, the duties placed on the state to protect and respect the 
1954 Convention rights of stateless persons is balanced by the responsibility of the stateless 
person to abide by the rules and laws of the state in question.  
Additionally, a state is obliged to grant certain rights to a stateless person if they are 
officially under the jurisdiction of that state and another set of rights if they are “lawfully in” a 
state party, such as the right to self-employment (Article 18), freedom of movement within a 
state (Article 26) and protection against expulsion (Article 31). Regarding international law, one 
of the most important rights for stateless persons is in Article 12(4) of the ICCPR which allows 
53 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 5. 
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 someone to enter their “own country” of nationality if their citizenship has been stripped away in 
violation of international law.  54
The Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons recommends that persons waiting for 
the results of their statelessness determination procedure are to be granted the rights of an 
individual “lawfully in” the territory, or the same rights as an individual who is seeking asylum. 
Additionally, the handbook suggests that granting individuals the right to earn a wage may 
reduce the burden on the state to provide resources and even provides the individual a sense of 
dignity and self-sufficiency.  This is an approach that is employed in Jordan where some 55
persons who are not registered with UNHCR continue to work from their homes or under the 
radar to provide for themselves and rely less on humanitarian aid. One solution to avoid a 
heavier burden on the state is to grant persons a residence permit valid for two years at the 
minimum. Additionally, there is a possibility of an individual to acquire or re-acquire nationality 
within another state if there is a rapid and simple process available. This is not a viable option if 
the nationality acquisition process only offered transitional status to stateless persons because 
this process is unreliable and has no guaranteed outcome. Also, this process requires the 
individual to be present in the state in question which is not always a feasible requirement.  
Finally, many individuals who qualify as a stateless person under the 1954 Convention 
definition, live in states that are not signatories of this treaty. However, as mentioned above, the 
recommendations laid out in the Convention are applicable to any state that is addressing 
statelessness in their territories. States that are not signatories should take special note of the 
practice to provide identity papers and travel documents to stateless persons which is a practice 
54 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 57. 
55 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 47. 
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 that has been adopted by a number of non-contracting states. Streamlining practices like the 
above will decrease the burden on individual states to address statelessness on their own. 
Importantly, all states must comply with their obligations under international human rights law, 
such as protection against arbitrary detention and the right to enter and remain in one’s own 
country (Article 9(1) and Article 12(4) of the ICCPR).  ​De facto ​statelessness is not included in 56
the protection of the 1954 Convention, but it is recommended that they receive temporary 
permission or else residence permit to remain inside the host country in order to ensure a level of 
stability. Where there are obstacles to securing either of those permits, this handbook 
recommends humanitarian considerations support local solutions through the process of 
nationalization as the best response. This concludes the summary and analysis of the 
recommendations presented in the Handbook on the Protection of Stateless Persons published by 
UNHCR.  
 
Case Studies: 
Jordan 
Jordan is a constitutional monarchy ruled by King Abdullah II bin Hussein. The 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has a population of 10 million as of 2019 and is bordered by Iraq, 
Syria, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Palestine. Jordan, as we know it today, came into existence after 
WWII and gained its independence from Britain in 1946. The capital of Jordan is Amman, with a 
population of about 4 million people. Roughly 96% of Jordanians are Arabs but other minority 
56 ​Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, pg 15. 
39 
 groups exist. About 82% of Jordan’s population is Muslim with 93% being Sunni Muslims and 
only 6% being Christian.  57
On 15 June there were 666,590 Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR Jordan.  
Unaccompanied or separated children number 3,235. Single parent homes number 19,908. The 
largest influx of refugees entering Jordan happened in 2013 reaching 665,097 and since then has 
continually dwindled each year reaching only 12,898 in 2018.  58
There are 89 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants in Jordan. The government of Jordan has 
taken concrete steps to provide refugees assistance. Nearly 50,000 refugees have active work 
permits. The U.S. supports UNHCR’s Jordan operations with 274.9 million dollars as of June 
2018. UNHCR can process up to 4,000 refugees a day at the largest urban registration centre in 
the MENA region, which is UNHCR’s Anmar Hmoud Registration Centre in Amman.   59
In 2016, the U.S Department of State published a human rights report on Jordan. Jordan’s 
main human rights problems are citizens’ inability to choose their ultimate governing authority, 
restrictions on the freedom of expression, and the mistreatment and allegations of torture by 
security and government officials. Additionally, other human rights violations include the 
prevention of the entrance of refugees, deportation of asylum seekers, and stripping of 
Palestinian refugees from Syria of their Jordanian citizenship. There are also reports of legal and 
57 ​“Jordan Population 2019.” Jordan Population 2019. 
58 ​“Operational Portal.” Document - ​UNHCR Jordan External Statistical Report on UNHCR 
Registered Syrians 15 June 2018​. 
59 ​“Operational Portal.” Document - ​UNHCR Jordan External Statistical Report on UNHCR 
Registered Syrians 15 June 2018​. 
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 societal discrimination against women which adds to the legal complications of nationality only 
being passed down through the birth father and gender discrimination within nationality law.   60
Section d. “Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, 
and Stateless Persons” relates to Jordan’s human rights abuses as reported in 2016. Jordan’s law 
guarantees the freedom of movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, however some 
restrictions apply. UNHCR and UNRWA reported that Jordan’s government cooperated for the 
most part in providing assistance and protection to refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, 
and internally displaced persons. Regarding, freedom of in-country movement, Jordan subjected 
asylum seekers to forced return to Syria following a suicide attack at the Jordanian/Syrian border 
where seven members of the government’s armed guards were killed. Authorities cleared and 
transferred around 1,500 asylum seekers who were in the process of registering at the Azraq 
camp inside Jordan.  
As of November 9th, 2016 UNHCR with the cooperation of the Jordanian government, 
reported over 655,000 registered Syrian refugees, this does not include the number of 
unregistered Syrian refugees. As noted earlier, Jordan is not a signatory of the 1954 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, however, the Jordanian government 
respects UNHCR’s eligibility determination procedures and official recommendations seen in 
their handbook and as written in international humanitarian law. In fact, in 2014, the Jordanian 
government renewed a treaty they signed with UNHCR in 1998 regarding the official definition 
of a refugee, agreeing to respect the principle of non-refoulement, and providing up to a year for 
60 ​Jordan 2016 Human Rights Report. State Department, 2016, Jordan 2016 Human Rights 
Report. 
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 a refugee to stay in country while UNHCR seeks a durable solution. In 2014, the government 
decreed that all Syrian refugees must obtain an official residency card distributed by the Ministry 
of Interior. Additionally, each refugee over the age of 12 must obtain a health certificate which 
cost five JD (the equivalent of seven dollars).   61
Another human rights violation committed by the government was banning a number of 
Syrian refugees from entering the country to seek asylum. The government only allowed for 
minimal entry across its northeastern desert border. Official estimates reported that between 
70,000 and 100,000 Syrians camped at the northest desert border during 2016. Jordan allowed 
minimal humanitarian aid to be distributed to the Syrians along this border. UNHCR 
recommended the government to allow the sick, elderly, children, and pregnant women be 
admitted into refugee camps as asylum seekers for access to food, water, and medical care.  
Additionally, the government was found guilty of refoulement, forcefully returning 
Syrian refugees and stateless persons to Syria. Some of those forced to return where women, 
childre, war-injured, as well as persons with disabilities. The Jordanian government returned 
some Syrian refugees that were found to be working illegally, not presenting refugee 
documentation, and living in informal tented settlements to areas of Syria such Dara’s Province 
that was not safe for return. Some areas of Dara’s Province were controlled in 2016 by Da’esh 
(the transliterated Arabic word for ISIS).   62
Regarding employment, the Jordanian government did allow Syrian refugees to work in 
the formal labor market and provided 50,000 opportunities for Syrian refugees during 2016. 
61 ​Jordan 2016 Human Rights Report, pg 21. 
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 Work permits were released through the Ministry of Labor and between February and November 
2016, around 32,000 permits were granted to refugees. The government even waived fees for 
applying for work permits and extended amnesties for Syrians working illegally in order to 
combat statelessness and regularize their status. The downside to this process, were legal gaps 
between what the government promised and what the Ministry of Labor delivered. For example, 
offices of the Ministry of Labor had difficulty implementing their procedures outside the city 
limits of the capital, Amman. Also, many refugees did not know the procedure to request a work 
permit and feared applying for a work permit would bar them from receiving humanitarian aid 
from UNHCR. For this reason, thousands of Syrian refugees continued to work in the informal 
market economy even though a government commissioned report stated that 26% of Syrian 
refugees were active in the national labor market.  An estimated 3,000 Syrians continued to 63
work in the unofficial labor market and there were reports of the government detaining and 
deporting Syrian refugees for working without authorization. 
Regarding access to basic services, the Jordanian government transports newly arriving 
Syrian refugees to Raba’s Sarhan reception center. Here, refugees register through the official 
UNHCR process and receive food, water and medical attention either through ICRC or UNHCR. 
However, stateless persons who fear official registration through the Jordanian government may 
opt out of this process by crossing the border illegally. Authorities have limited entry for Syrians 
accessing asylum along the northeastern border since 2014. It was also reported that these Syrian 
refugees were denied aid from humanitarian organizations while the crossing was closed and 
63 ​Jordan 2016 Human Rights Report, pg 4. 
43 
 authorities did not permit the stranded persons to enter Jordan or register as refugees. This 
situation adds to the statelessness problem in Jordan.   64
The most prominent manifestation of human rights abuses in Jordan adding to the 
number of stateless persons is gender discriminatory nationality laws. Under Jordanian law, only 
the father can transmit nationality to their child. Women do not have the legal right. This law 
manifests itself in many ways. For example, if a female citizen gets married to a male noncitizen, 
their children will receive the nationality of their father and will be denied the right to attend 
public school and other government services in Jordan. They will not hold legal residency and 
they must reapply every year with no guarantee of it being granted. Since 2014, if children of 
Jordanian mothers and noncitizen fathers apply and obtain certain criteria they should be able to 
gain access to free primary and secondary education as well as subsidized health care. Also, they 
will be granted the right to own property, invest, and obtain a Jordanian driver’s license.  65
According to a report from the Minister of Interior, this ruling affected 88,983 families and 
355,932 children where the father was a noncitizen. However, children in this position must first 
apply for and obtain an identification card through the Civil Status Bureau and currently reside in 
Jordan with their mother having lived in Jordan for at least five years.   66
This issue applies to Syrian refugee parents unable to present an official marriage 
certificate or other form of nationality document when their child is born inside Jordan. Often 
identification documents are destroyed or lost when refugees flee their homeland or are 
confiscated by government authorities at the border. Single mother refugee households have 
64 ​Jordan 2016 Human Rights Report, pg 23. 
65 ​Jordan 2016 Human Rights Report, pg 24. 
66 ​Jordan 2016 Human Rights Report, pg 24. 
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 difficulty certifying the nationality of their children when the father is not present or has died. 
This increases the probability of statelessness among refugees because if there isn’t a father 
present with Syrian citizenship and the mother’s nationality does not legally transmit to her 
child, then the child is left without a nationality. The child is not Syrian since their Syrian father 
is not present and they are not Jordanian since they are born in a refugee camp. It doesn’t matter 
that their mother is Syrian, or even Jordanian (in the rare occurrence that the mother was 
originally Jordanian before moving to Syria where she fled with her family after the conflict and 
her husband was not able to flee with her). In either case, the nationality of the mother is a mute 
point since she is not able to transmit nationality  to her child. Government authorities have set 
up civil registry departments and sharia courts in the Azraq and Za’atri camps (the two largest 
refugee camps in Jordan) to help refugees register at birth and decrease their vulnerability to 
becoming stateless.   67
Interestingly, gender discriminatory nationality law also affect other groups of children 
besides refugee children. The government did not provide birth certificates to every child born in 
Jordan during the fiscal year. Children of unmarried women, orphans, interfaith marriages, 
illegitimate or abandoned children are not eligible for nationality under Jordanian law. If a 
refugee child qualifies under either of the groups above then it is more difficult for them to have 
access to public education, health services, or to receive other forms of identification 
documentation.  
This concludes the section on human rights abuses facing Syrian refugees and stateless 
persons in Jordan as reported by the United States Department of State annual report.   68
67 ​Jordan 2016 Human Rights Report, pg 35. 
68 ​Jordan 2016 Human Rights Report, pg 43. 
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 Discriminatory Nationality Laws in Jordan and Their Effect on Mixed Refugee Families 
A report from the journal of the Program on Law and Human Development at the 
University of Notre Dame Law School published that Jordan hosts an estimated 2 million 
refugees with the highest percentage of refugees in the world per capita. The gender 
discrimination within the nationality laws makes it especially difficult for women lead refugee 
households since women can not pass on their nationality to their children. Approximately 
65,000 Jordanian women and about 500,000 children are affected by these laws. Some scholars 
argue that Jordan’s nationality laws are contrary to its obligations due to treaties and 
international law.   69
This section of the paper explores the history of the gender discrimination in Jordan’s 
nationality laws as well as how the law disproportionately affects refugee families. Jordanian law 
regarding citizenship is outlined in Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality and additionally in its 1987 
amendment. Specifically, article 3 states “(3) Any person whose father holds Jordanian 
nationality; (4) Any person born in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of a mother holding 
Jordanian nationality and of a father of unknown nationality or of a Stateless father or whose 
filiation is not established; (5) Any person born in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of 
unknown parents, as a founding in the Kingdom shall be considered born in the Kingdom 
pending evidence to the contrary.”   70
Also, Article 9 states “the children of Jordanian men shall be Jordanian wherever they are 
born.” It is interesting that the provision is provided for citizenship to be granted through the 
mother if she is Jordanian and the father is stateless if and only if the child is born within the 
69 ​Emanuel, James. ​Discriminatory Nationality Laws in Jordan and Their Effect ​, 2012. 
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 country. It must be that the father is officially a non-Jordanian citizen in order for the law to 
exclude women from passing down their nationality to their children. This analysis implies that 
the law is more concerned with the nationality standing of the father being specifically a 
non-Jordanian citizen instead of the fact that he is a Jordanian citizen. In addition, Jordanian 
women are not allowed to pass on their nationality to the non-native spouses.   71
The gender discrimination within Jordan’s nationality laws are harmful to women for 
multiple reasons. Not only are they unable to pass down their citizenship to their children but 
women are treated as second class citizens. A Jordanian’s rights as a citizen are determined by 
whether they are a male or a female rather than whether they are a Jordanian or not. The question 
remains, where does the basis for Jordan’s laws come from? Some scholars argue that patrilineal 
nationality is mandated by Sharia law. One Islamic Sheikh quoted Sura 33, verse 5, from the 
Quran that refers to children of Muslim parents and says “call them by the names of their father: 
that is (more just) in the sight of God”.  
However, other prominent scholars and sheikhs argue this verse does not support 
patrilineal nationality. These scholars interpret verses in the Quran like this one as referring to 
“Nassah” which is the relationship between the father and child and not the mother, rather than 
referring to nationality laws. In fact, these scholars go further to argue that the concept of 
“Nassh” is already accounted for in Jordanian law elsewhere where it states a child must take the 
surname of their father and not their mother. In the end, there is not a strong argument that 
gender discrimination in Jordan’s nationality laws is supported or confirmed by the Quran. 
Interestingly, the history and origin of Jordanian nationality law stems more from the British 
71 ​Emanuel, James. Pg 4. 
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 Nationality Law than it does from Sharia Law. The effects of Imperialism had a larger effect on 
nationality laws in Jordan than the official religion of the country.   72
Also, politicians argue granting nationality to non-native husbands and the children of 
Jordanian women and non-Jordanian men might ultimately decrease national resources. 
However, commentators suggest the opposite is true. If Jordanian women were allowed to pass 
on their nationality to their children than it is estimated the country would receive an economic 
benefit. Families who pass on their nationality to their children in this manner already live in 
Jordan and increased citizenship results in greater human capital, increased tax revenue, 
investment, and consumption. Experts say allowing family members citizenship when the mother 
is a Jordanian citizen would increase the national net gain of 10 million JD to Jordan’s economy. 
Scholars have termed the issue regarding Jordanian’s law with gender discrimination as 
“masculinity-based nationalism” (34 Amawi, supra note 12, at 164).   73
Discriminatory laws such as this one greatly affect Jordan whose population is one third 
foreign-born. Husbands and children of Jordanian women do not have the right to remain in the 
Kingdom and even though gaining a residency permit is ​possible ​it is a very difficult and rarely a 
successful process and is especially difficult for refugee families. If a child or non-citizen spouse 
does not have their birth and marriage certificates and identity papers prior to applying for a 
residency permit, they are extremely vulnerable to becoming stateless. Jordan’s residency laws 
are outlined by Chapter 3 of Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs (Law No. 
24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners' Affairs (Jordan), at chap. 3 (Jan. 1, 1973). 
72 ​Emanuel, James. Pg 5. 
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 Even if a residency permit is granted, it is only good for one year and must be renewed 
by the Ministry of Labor directorate. As outlined by Law No. 29 of 1973 on Residence and 
Foreigners' Affairs: anyone eligible to apply for a residency permit must: (a) have an 
employment contract with a Jordanian employer, along with certification from the Ministry of 
Labor that his activities are not in competition with those of Jordanians, or (b) have certification 
of secure and lawful source of income, or (c) have the intention and approval to invest in the 
Jordanian economy, or (d) unique skills for which there is no equivalent in the Kingdom.  74
Refugees and stateless persons face an impossible challenge because to obtain a work permit 
they must have a residency permit, but to obtain a residency permit they must have a work 
permit. Lack of both permits results in a person becoming either a refugee, or if they don’t have a 
birth or marriage certificate, becoming a stateless person.  75
Next, the thesis will explore what the Jordanian government is doing to address 
statelessness in their country. Recently, the government decided to rectificate the status 
campaign which aims to formalize the legal status of unregistered Syrian refugees living in urban 
areas. This campaign also allows refugees to obtain service cards from the Ministry of Interior 
for access to basic services such as education and health care. To register, refugees can access 
help desks at UNHCR’s mobile registration sites in Irbid, Mafraq, and Amman. Over 5,299 cases 
and 18,357 individuals have received rectified status through UNHCR. This campaign lasted 
until September 28th, 2018.  
After the London Conference of 2016 regarding the Syrian refugee crisis, the Jordanian 
governmnet decided to waive the fees of obtaining a work permit. This decision largely helped 
74 ​Emanuel, James. Pg 10.  
75  ​Emanuel, James. Pg 13. 
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 Syrian refugees in Jordan because occupations became more likely to hire foreign workers and 
the documentation requirements were simplified. Over 49,000 refugees currently have work 
permits and over 100,000 work permits have been renewed since 2016.   76
However, difficulties continue and over 100,000 Syrians remain unable to register due to 
document deficiencies or other obstacles. Conflict at the berm, a portion of the Syrian-Jordanian 
border, continued to rise throughout 2017 after the border officially closed in June 2016. Another 
complicating factor related to the protection of refugees is the continued presence of terrorist 
groups in the Levante. For example, according to the 2016 State Department Country Reports on 
Terrorism, ISIS and al Qaeda and affiliates have a presence in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon. While 
Hizballah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps both have a presence in Syria and 
Lebanon. These terrorists groups are responsible for numerous attacks on civilians throughout 
the past year and pose a threat to NGOs and IOs delivering aid to refugees. This issue also marks 
a key difference between the refugee response in Jordan and Lebanon.   77
PRM accounts for this by partnering with UNRWA to put controls in place and conduct 
in-person monitoring visits to mitigate the risk of terrorist financing. There is a much lower risk 
of diversion in Jordan compared to Lebanon. This is one of the differences between the two host 
countries that makes it harder for Lebanon to organize its response to the refugee crisis. It costs 
Lebanon time and resources dedicated to mitigating the terrorist risk in its country that it 
otherwise could focus on it refugee response. Jordan has the advantage on this issue.  
76 ​Jordan Fact Sheet. Geneva, 2018, pp. 1–4, ​Human Rights Report by the U.S. Department of 
State​. 
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 In the U.S. State Department’s goals for the fiscal year 2018, they advocated for the 
Jordanian government to allow UN agencies greater access to deliver humanitarian aid. This 
includes refugees inside the country as well as in the berm region. They also advocated the 
Jordanian government complete refugee security screening for those admitted in 2016 to the 
Azraq Camp to enable free movement within the camp boundaries. This is an important policy 
point because the longer the Jordanian government delays security screening the longer a refugee 
is at risk for statelessness. To fully complete the security screening in Jordan, a refugee must 
obtain a Ministry of Interior card. This documentation allows refugees access to humanitarian aid 
and basic health care inside the host country.   78
Currently, PRM funded and oversaw IOM-operated Resettlement Support Centers in 
Amman, Jordan and a sub-office of the ICMC-operated Resettlement Support Center in Beirut, 
Lebanon. PRM also runs a program to identify and implement in-person monitoring visits to host 
countries where the political and military security conditions are too unstable for PRM officials 
to visit. In Lebanon, PRM does this by hiring Refugee Specialists that are local citizens to visit 
program sites and conduct in-person monitoring visits on behalf of the U.S. government. Since 
FY 2012, PRM has contributed $3.74 billion to the Syrian humanitarian crisis. In FY 2017, PRM 
gave $179.5 million to Syria, $160.5 million to Jordan, and $275.5 million to Lebanon.   79
Another organization that is key to expanding livelihood, health, and food access to 
refugees and those vulnerable to statelessness is USAID. In its recent report, PRM recognized 
the ways both agencies should prioritize working together to support relief and development in 
Jordan and Lebanon. PRM is dedicated to fulfilling its role in the Syrian refugee crisis. In FY 
78  ​U.S. State Department.​ Syria Organizational and Regional Policy Paper. ​FY 2018. 
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 2017, USAID/OFDA contributed $290.3 million to the humanitarian response in Syria. 
USAID/FFP contributed $401.8 million for humanitarian aid for Syrian refugees inside host 
countries. As well as supporting both the Jordanian and Lebanese governments burden the cost 
of the refugee population affecting the countries’ education and water systems.   80
Lebanon 
Lebanon is a parliamentary republic since the establishment of the 1943 National Pact 
that appointed a Maronite Christian president and Shia speaker of the Chamber of Deputies and a 
Sunni prime minister. Lebanon hosts over 856,546 refugees. Interestingly, Lebanon does not 
allow UNHCR to report on the number of stateless persons in country and therefore there are 
zero persons reported under UNHCR’s statelessness mandate. In addition, Lebanon is not a 
signatory of either the Convention of 1954 or Convention of 1960 regarding statelessness and 
thus stateless persons in their country are not included in UNHCR’s statelessness mandate. 
However, UNHCR has been an active partner with the government of Lebanon until June of 
2018 when Lebanon froze UNHCR’s staff residency applications. This was a reaction against 
accusations of UNHCR staff “spreading fear” and discouraging Syrian refugees from returning 
home.   81
Although there are not qualitative statistics regarding the number of Syrian refugees in 
Jordan, UNHCR estimates there are over 50,000 children born stateless in the Middle Eastern 
region. Even though a large number of those children are eligible for Syrian citizenship, the 
Syrian government is not able to grant them citizenship and so they are left vulnerable to the 
80  ​U.S. State Department, pg 4. 
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 laws regarding statelessness in their host country.  UNHCR found that nearly 78% of new births 82
reported since arriving in Lebanon were not registered with the local authorities.   83
In 2016, the U.S Department of State published a human rights report on Lebanon. The 
most prominent human right abuses in Lebanon regard arbitrary or unlawful killings, allegations 
of torture by security forces, violation of citizens’ privacy rights, restrictions on freedoms of 
speech, press and assembly. In addition, there are laws in place that criminalize forms of political 
expression in contrast to what international organizations have recommended.  There is also a 84
lack of governmental investigation into the abuse against refugees and the limits on political 
participation in elections due to deeply rooted corruption in the government.  
The country has also suffered a great deal both economically and politically due to the 
Syrian conflict. The civil war has created a massive refugee crisis that strained Lebanon’s 
infrastructure and ability to provide social services. The crisis has also increased terrorist activity 
in the region. Despite efforts by UN security forces and the Lebanese government, Hezbollah 
maintains significant influence in the region. The law does allow for the freedom of internal 
movement, emigration, foreign travel, and repatriation and the government has placed many 
additional limitations on the rights of refugees. As of June 30th, 2017, UNHCR registered more 
than 1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Multiple reports from NGO’s and UNHCR speak of 
sexual harassment and exploitation of refugees by the government or landlords or employers. A 
82 ​“UNHCR Lebanon Statelessness Update.” UNHCR, 2014, pg 8. 
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 few examples of exploitation include working long hours, debt bondage, and forcing families 
into early marriage or non-consensual sex or rape for their daughters.   85
As determined by the report of the U.S. Department of State, the Lebanese government 
lacks the capacity to provide adequate protection for refugees. Refugees self reported instances 
of abuse by political parties or gangs. This type of abuse would take the form of LAF (Lebanese 
Armed Forces) raids on settlements where harassment and vandalism of personal property 
ensued. The Lebanese authorities required all Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR to pay of 
300,000 Lebanese pounds ($200 U.S. dollars) to annually renewal their registration if they were 
15 years old or above in order to remain in the country legally. This legislation was only valid 
until February of 2017. For refugees arriving January 2015 or later, the legislation said that they 
can only enter the country if the refugee has a Lebanese sponsor.   86
The financial stipulation and sponsor requirement is extremely difficult for a Syrian 
refugee to obtain. The DGS (General Security Directorate), the Lebanese government 
intelligence agency decided to waive the fees for residency renewal for all refugees who 
registered with UNHCR before 2015. However, this law did not include stateless persons, or 
unregistered refugees as well as those who had a Lebanese sponsorship, property ownership, or 
tourism in 2015-2016. Unfortunately, many DGS offices did not implement this change 
effectively and very few refugees benefited from this ruling due to inconsistent local practices. 
However, Syrian refugees have a legal right to residency through nationwide implementation of 
85 ​Ending Statelessness Within 10 Years. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
2014. 
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 the residency fee waiver. PRM continues to advocate for expansion of the waiver to include all 
refugees to ensure safe and dignified asylum with documentation being a key focus.   87
The issue of implementing a residency fee waiver continues to be a contributor to 
increasing statelessness in Lebanon. The United Nations’ conducted a household assessment of 
over 100,000 Syrian refugee families, around 85% of them had at least one member who did not 
have legal status due to problems renewing their residency. The majority of Syrian refugees face 
challenges because of the unorganized implementation of residency renewal processes. When a 
refugee is unable to renew their residency they have limited freedom of movement in country 
due to the possibility of arrests at checkpoints. Authorities fail to release detainees on time and 
there have been reports of detainees being forced to pay a fine before release. This phenomenon 
especially affects adult men who are at greater risk of being arrested.   88
The government of Lebanon has remained mostly committed to its agreement of 
non-refoulement. Although, it has been guilty of detaining Syrian refugees without legal cause 
broke their commitment to not force the return of refugees to their homeland according to 
UNHCR’s records. Even though the country does not legally allow for the granting of asylum or 
refugee status, Lebanon has hosted an estimated 1.5 million refugees registered with UNHCR.  
As of 2015, the Lebanese government demanded UNHCR to stop registering Syrian 
refugees. Some scholars suggest that the government did not want to continue registering 
refugees in an effort to dissuade other refugees fleeing to their country. It is unclear if this effort 
was successful since there is no way to officially count the number of refugees currently living in 
Lebanon since UNHCR was instructed to end their registration procedures. Estimates project that 
87 ​Ending Statelessness Within 10 Years, pg 7. 
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 18% of Syrian refugees live in temporary tent settlements with no plumbing, dirt floors and 
limited heating options. Another major issue facing refugees both registered and unregistered 
living in Lebanon is debt. About 90% of Syrian refugees borrow money in order to pay for their 
basic living needs such as health care, food, and rent. Also, ​there is an insecure environment 
including armed actors, aid seizure, diversion, fraud and corruption due to terrorist groups 
interfering with PRM’s efforts to deliver aid.   89
In 2015, the Lebanese government created new regulations to ban all Syrian refugees 
from entering the country unless they qualified for “humanitarian exceptions”. Such exceptions, 
as defined by the Ministry of Social Affairs, were reviewed on a case by case situation and 
included separated children, persons with disabilities, the sick, and elderly. Additionally, 
UNHCR reported that there was a number of evictions that disproportionately affected Syrian 
refugees after the event of security incidents. The LAF carried out evictions that affected the 
informal refugee settlements which were closely located to important supply routes or to LAF 
headquarters. These events also increased the risk of statelessness affecting refugees who have 
no place to stay and no formal settlement to live in. For example, on March 2017, an estimated 
3,175 individuals were relocated from their homes in the Riyak area and the Zahle municipality 
and were forced to find new informal settlements to live in.   90
Currently, Lebanese authorities allow Syrian refugees to obtain a residency permit in 
which they agree to abide by Lebanese rules and authorities. This permit allows Syrian refugees 
to work in agriculture, construction and cleaning. This is another example of a disadvantage 
89 ​“Lebanon Freezes UNHCR Staff Residency Applications in Row over...” ​ Reuters, Thomson 
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 facing stateless persons. In order to receive even a basic form of work permit, a refugee must 
obtain a residency permit. But to receive a residency permit, a refugee must be able to provide 
identity papers and register as an official refugee in country. This process is not an option for any 
persons who don’t have a birth certificate or other form of identity documentation.   91
Regarding educational opportunities, the Lebanese Ministry of Education and the Higher 
Education provided 195,000 spots in public schools for non-citizen children in the 2016-2017 
school year. Even though this created a positive opportunity for stateless children, the ruling was 
also negative because the Ministry of Education banned informal education assistance to refugee 
children. NGO’s in Lebanon offered to provide educational opportunities for Syrian refugee 
children and stateless children to help students catch up when they were not performing at grade 
level. However, the Ministry of Education ruled that no informal educational opportunities be 
offered unless it was directly linked to the public school system. This law limited the number of 
refugees and stateless children access to education and many NGO’s had to terminate 
educational programs they had in place.   92
Due to a lack of education, many refugee and stateless children in Lebanon were forced 
to live and work on the street. Many Syrian refugee families rely on their children to make 
money for the family because the adults are limited in their freedom of movement and livelihood 
opportunities. Because of this, refugee and stateless children are at greater risk of child labor and 
exploitation since they have more freedom of movement than their parents who don’t have a 
residency permit.  
91 ​Lebanon Fact Sheet, pg 21. 
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 In Lebanon, the law rules that citizenship can only be derived from the father. This means 
that any child born of a mother who is a Lebanese citizen and a father who is not a Lebanese 
citizen, the child also will not be a Lebanese citizen. This gender discrimination in the law is 
especially affecting female lead refugee households. Another problem is that many children born 
to a Lebanese father did not register for citizenship at birth due to a lack of understanding the 
rules and regulations of nationality law. If a family does not register their child for a birth 
certificate within the first year of their life, the process for legitimizing the birth is long and costs 
a great deal. This process is often a large deterrent for families, even families with Lebanese 
fathers, to register their children.  These children become stateless whether they are born to 93
refugee families or not. In either case, statelessness is a hereditary circumstance that stateless 
parents pass on to their children. There are however, no official statistics on the number of 
stateless persons since they are unregistered. This concludes the section on human rights abuses 
facing Syrian refugees and stateless persons in Lebanon as reported by the United States 
Department of State annual report.   94
Next, the thesis will explore what the government is doing to address statelessness issues 
in their nation. In Lebanon, UNHCR is barred from registering new Syrian refugees and so many 
refugees are at risk of arrest and harassment since they lack legal residency. In 2017, political 
tensions and public anger regarding the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has grown. Even 
the Hezbollah political coalition called for an agreement with the Assad government to create a 
pathway of safe return for refugees back into Syria. In spite of the growing pressures and 
tensions, Lebanon has maintained its policy of non-refoulement for Syrians. Prime Minister Saad 
93 ​Lebanon Fact Sheet, pg 29. 
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 Hariri resigned suddenly in November 2017 following tensions with Saudi Arabia. This has 
created a political stir that threatens the current policy toward non-refoulement.   95
On June 8th, 2018 Reutres reported that Lebanon’s Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil 
required a freeze of all residency applications for UNHCR staff stationed in their country. The 
reasoning given was that Lebanon’s government suspected UNHCR staff of spreading rumors 
that it was not safe to return to Syria. This upset local authorities who believed UNHCR was 
discouraging Syrian refugees from returning home even though Lebanon deemed them 
otherwise. Lebanon hosts over one million Syrian refugees and Lebanon is feeling strained by 
the drain of public services and growing economic hardship. Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil and 
other officials are calling for refugees to return to “secure areas” in Syria instead of remaining in 
refugee camps in Lebanon.  
However, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees denies these claims and says that its 
staff has not discouraged refugees from returning home if the refugee expressed a genuine desire. 
However, UNHCR remains committed to a policy of non-refoulement and will never support a 
nation who encourages or forces refugees to return home against their will if the conditions are 
not safe according to the UN’s standard and assessment. Tensions have remained high since 
summer of 2018 between Lebanon and UNHCR.  96
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 Conclusions: 
The refugee issue is too big for one country to solve, instead the solution must be a group 
effort. Attempting to resolve the refugee crisis in isolation of the regional security environment is 
a waste of resources and increases frustration between states. The millions of refugees fleeing 
Syria don’t affect countries individually. The attempt to solve the refugee crisis one country at a 
time leads to the relocation of violence and instability to its neighbors instead of a long term 
solution.  
The role of the United Nations is to write reports, provide recommendations, and pass 
resolutions that encourage European states to work together to address the refugee crisis. The 
UN advocates for fair and effective pathways for asylum seekers across the Middle East and for 
local governments to enhance opportunities and support local integration of refugees. 
Economic down turns and political strains are felt across the continent because of the 
geographical proximity and interconnectedness of EU member states and the Middle East. 
Working together allows countries to find durable solutions with the financial and social support 
of the international community. For example, the amount of U.S. aid to Europe through the UN 
increased from 487 million dollars in 2014 to 878 million dollars in 2016 when the Syrian 
refugee crisis began.  97
Also, in 2016 all 193 UN member states signed the New York Declaration for Refugees 
and Migrants agreeing to protect those forced to flee and supporting host countries as a shared 
international responsibility. Since this declaration, the High Commissioner for Refugees has 
97 ​“Europe.” ​Europe | Global Focus ​, UNHCR, 2018, reporting.unhcr.org/node/31. 
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 drafted and presented the Global Compact on Refugees and Migration to the General Assembly. 
These compacts aim to ease pressures on host countries, enhance refugees self-reliance, expand 
third country solutions, and support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and 
dignity (UNHCR Declaration, 2016). The UN drafts recommendations and passes legally 
binding resolutions that aim to streamline registration and aid distribution for refugees. The UN 
can also act as a mediator during treaty negotiations between states decreasing the chance of 
conflict of interest. 
Even though its drafting in 2017 was a step forward for countries working together to 
solve the refugee crisis, it had to be approved by the 193 members of the UN General Assembly 
by December 2018. The language in the document is non-binding yet countries like the U.S. are 
hesitate to commit too much aid or support for European refugee policy.​ ​One of the greatest 
challenges in resolving statelessness is the lack of numerical data on the issue. This is due to the 
nature of what statelessness entails, mainly unregistered persons. There is no method for 
counting or recording the number of people not registered and not a part of any governmental or 
international organizational database.   98
Another challenge facing UNHCR and Jordan when implementing its goal to end 
statelessness is reforming nationality laws which is a tedious and difficult practice. Also, strong 
political and social views against the stateless population are difficult to overcome. Many social 
groups in Jordan resent the stateless population because they believe non-refugee stateless 
persons are draining national resources. This complaint especially affects non-refugee stateless 
98 ​Ending Statelessness Within 10 Years. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
2014. 
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 persons because if they are not registered refugees then they are not counted in the national 
refugee count and therefore not included in how much international aid is allocated to Jordan as a 
host nation. 
 
Recommendations: 
Solutions​: 
The best solution to eradicate statelessness is to increase number of countries offering 
birthright citizenship. During the keynote address at the Global Forum on Statelessness in 
September 2014, Nils Muiznieks, the Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council of Europe 
stated “The automat granting of citizenship at birth to children who would otherwise be stateless, 
is probably the best tool to eradicate statelessness at birth and prevent its transmission from 
generation to generation”. In fact, article 15(1) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
states that everyone has the right to citizenship. The UN’s #IBelong campaign to end 
statelessness by 2024 encourages Jordan and Lebanon to abide by the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights by offering citizenship to children born within the state’s territory and who 
otherwise are at risk of statelessness. This requirement is a version of jus soli.  
Another prominent solution is for the UN to provide their own type of citizenship to 
stateless persons. This citizenship would resemble something like an E.U. citizenship and would 
help protect stateless children by providing them documentation and basic rights under the 
United Nations. Applicable rights for stateless persons include the right to non-discrimination on 
the basis of nationality and the right to move and reside freely. Problems to this solution include 
the reluctance of states to provide protection for stateless persons or enforce refugees’ rights. 
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 Also, due to continual conflict in the Middle East it is hard to determine who and where refugees 
are at risk of stateless and overcome their fear of authorities or lack of resources that prohibit 
them from registering  
It is also important to make sure the father’s name is included on a child’s birth 
registration form. This is problematic because estimates say 25% of Syrian refugee households 
are fatherless either because the father died, went missing, or was separated from their family. 
Without the physical presence of the father there is a lack of proof of nationality. To address this 
problem, UNHCR urges host countries to simplify the registration process at birth so that 
children can be regarded as Syrian citizens even if the father is physically not present.   99
There are two prominent UN treaties that address the issue of statelessness. The first is 
the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the 1954 Convention. 
Even though most European states have ratified both conventions, the majority have not adopted 
statelessness determination procedures and do not legally recognize statelessness status. As long 
as this attitude remains, there will not be a probable solution to ending statelessness even if every 
country becomes a signatory of the UN treaty. In addition, the Arab Charter on Human Rights 
provides every individual a right to a nationality and rules states must provide protection in 
accordance to their domestic laws to allow a mother to pass on her nationality to her child. 
Counties such as Jordan, Libya, UAE, and Saudi Arabia provide legal exceptions to children 
whose father has died to gain citizenship through their mother’s nationality, however these 
exceptions are not always upheld in practice.  100
99 ​Albarazi, Zahra. “The Stateless Syrians - Refworld.org.” ​Report of the Middle East and North 
Africa Nationality and Statelessness Research Project 7​ , 2017. 
100 ​Albarazi, Zahra. “The Stateless Syrians - Refworld.org.” ​Report of the Middle East and North 
Africa Nationality and Statelessness Research Project 7​ , 2017,  
63 
 Challenges​: 
One of the major challenges to decreasing statelessness in Jordan is the gender 
discriminatory laws that forbid women to pass on their nationality to their children or foreign 
husband. These laws make it nearly impossible for non-citizens to apply for residence or work 
permits and thus makes it difficult for a non-citizen to survive within the Kingdom. This issue 
disproportionately affects refugee families who have a spouse or child without a marriage or 
birth certificate and is vulnerable to statelessness. My recommendation includes ensuring that 
Jordan amend its nationality to allow women to pass on their nationality to their children.  
The international community should apply diplomatic pressure for Jordan to abide by its 
treaty obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) and ICCPR which forbid any signatory country to discriminate with 
its nationality law based on gender. Specifically, there is a violation between Jordan’s law and 
the ICCPR’s regarding articles 2(1) and 3 of the Covenant in conjunction with article 17(1). This 
change in law would affect an estimated 10% of the nation’s population who is negatively 
affected by gender discriminatory nationality law.   101
Additionally, I believe the international community should leverage their international 
monetary aid to Jordan by earmarking it for refugees. Many donor countries are contributing to 
developing infrastructure in Jordan and Syria in both health and education.  102
This recommendation is in line with Action 3 of the 10 Action points of UNHCR’s 
Global Action Plan to eradicate statelessness by 2024. Both the U.S. and the European Union are 
101 ​Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
102 ​Chatelard, Geraldine. “Iraqi Refugees and IDPs: From Humanitarian Intervention to Durable 
Solutions”. Report from the Foundation pour la Recherché Strategique, 2011. 
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 the largest international aid donors to Jordan and therefore have the most influence on pressuring 
the Kingdom to comply by international treaties that support human rights and women’s rights. 
The U.S. State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration should pressure 
Jordan to change Law No. 6 of 1954 and provide equal rights for women regarding nationality 
laws. If Jordan refuses to comply by this request the U.S. State Department could threaten to 
decrease the amount of funding earmarked for refugee relief. As one of the nation’s most 
supportive donors, the U.S. has a considerable amount of diplomatic leverage regarding the 
Kingdom’s political actions.   103
 
Future Questions: 
1. What will it take for the government of Lebanon to allow UNHCR to to restart operations 
in country?  
2. Which interest groups have the most power and leverage to lobby for legislative reform 
in both Lebanon and Jordan regarding gender discriminatory nationality laws? 
3. How effective are the international treaties that recommend countries create their own 
action plan to eradicate statelessness in their country. Are any countries currently 
carrying out their national action plan? 
4. Who is taking more steps to eradicate statelessness in their nation, Jordan or Lebanon? 
5. Are there any case studies from the past that would be helpful to refer to when searching 
for durable solutions in Jordan and Lebanon? 
103 ​Global Action Plan to End Statelessness: 2014-24. United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 2014. 
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